Closing the gap: gender parity in political engagement on social media

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Closing the gap: gender parity in political engagement on social media

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ABSTRACT

Historically, major gender differences exist in both political engagement and online content creation. Expanding on these literatures, this study considers the extent to which men and women engage in politics specifically in social media. Novel survey data are employed to test for any gendered differences in encountering and responding to political content via social media. Despite measuring a robust set of political behaviors within social media, few gender differences emerge. Where differences do emerge, they are most likely among the most visible political behaviors, suggesting that women may strategically engage in less visible or less-likely-to-offend political behaviors, as compared to men. This poses important questions regarding political participation, representation, and gender.

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KEYWORDS

Gender; political participation; social media; Internet; political knowledge

Gender differences in content creation online have been well-documented (see, e.g., Har- gittai & Walejko, 2008), as have gender differences in political communication, interest, and behaviors (Trevor, 1999; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). And these differences are important – setting up digital divides which produce inequalities of experience and opportunity (Robinson et al., 2015), and damaging the representativeness of politics in the USA (Friedland, Rojas, & Bode, 2012).

When considering the specific realm of social media, findings are mixed. Some research concludes that men are more likely to express themselves politically on social media (Lutz, Hoffmann, & Meckel, 2014; Strandberg, 2013; Vochocova, Stetka, & Mazak, 2016), while others find no such difference between genders (Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, & Shah, 2014; Vesnic-Alujevic, 2012). This study contributes to this debate by going beyond previous work to examine a range of political behaviors on social media. The greater the visibility of the behaviors, the greater the gender gap that emerges. This study, therefore, offers additional information about the role of gender in online environments, poses questions regarding under what circumstances we are most likely to see subgroup differences in online political settings, and updates our understanding of a well-documented phenomenon – the participatory gender gap in American politics – within the context of the evolving US society.

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Relevant research

To motivate expectations, I pull from two major streams of the literature. The first is research on the so-called ‘gender gap’ in political interest, political knowledge, and most importantly in political participation. The second is a similar gender-based difference in the tendency to create content online.

The political gender gap

Political participation, for the purposes of this study, is used interchangeably with the term political engagement. Engagement includes ‘any dimensions of social activity that are either designed directly to influence government agencies and the policy process, or indirectly to impact civil society, or which attempt to alter systematic patterns of social behavior’ (Norris, 2002, p. 16). While some have questioned the extent to which online engagement truly constitutes participation (Morozov, 2013), scholars now broadly acknowledge digital networked participation to be included in definitions of political engagement (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Theocharis, 2015). As seen below, this understanding of political engagement, when applied to social media, results in a wealth of possible opportunities for engagement.

Gendered differences in political engagement manifest in three main ways in the USA – differences in political interest, differences in political knowledge, and differences in political participation. Many of these differences emerge as early as late adolescence, when children begin to learn the social expectations of adult life (Hooghe & Stolle, 2004; Taft, 2006). While my primary focus is on political participation, political interest, and political knowledge are also considered, given their close relationship to broader political engagement (Verba et al., 1995).

Political interest

Perhaps the most important precursor to other types of political engagement, political interest is a well-studied element in American politics and one that systematically differs between men and women (Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). Men are quite a bit more likely than women to report being interested in politics, current affairs, and government. This gap is due to a number of factors, including situational, structural, and sex-role socialization (Bennett & Bennett, 1989). Socialization seems to play the largest role in creating a gap in political interest between the genders; as a result of progress made in gender equality, this gap has narrowed slightly over time, but still persists. Notably, this is not an exclusively American phenomenon – this gap persists across multiple countries (Hayes & Bean, 1993).

Political knowledge

Much research has also acknowledged a substantial gap in political knowledge between men and women (Verba et al., 1997). Women simply tend to know less about politics and the political process (Fridkin & Kenney, 2014). This gap is consistent (generally around 10 points (Dow, 2009)), with evidence of a modest but significant difference (ranging from 0 to 30 percentage points depending on the measure used) persisting from the early 1950s until the present day (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2005). Generally the median
score for men is roughly the 75th percentile for women, representing a substantial gap between this major predictor of political activity.

These differences are also often attributed to differences in socialization – men are encouraged or even expected to know about and/or participate in politics, whereas women are not (Greenstein, 1965; Hess & Torney, 1967), and men and women are mobilized by different types of messages (Brooks, 2010). The effects of gender on political knowledge are also mediated by both structural (economic advantage, occupation, income, etc.) and attitudinal (e.g., ideology) factors (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2005). The gap is also affected by what is classified as ‘political knowledge’ (Dolan, 2011), and it narrows when women are represented by female office holders (Fridkin & Kenney, 2014).

While part of this gap may be due to measurement issues (especially due to the tendency that men are more inclined to guess than are women, and due to implicit or explicit stereotype threat), the gap persists even when correcting for these issues (McGlone, Aronson, & Kobrynowicz, 2006; Mondak & Anderson, 2004).

As Delli Carpini and Keeter (2005) point out, this difference is monumentally important for politics in America. Political knowledge ‘stimulates and facilitates political participation,’ ‘has a powerful impact on the formation of political opinions and the processing of new information,’ and affects the ways in which voters consider their choices at the ballot box (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2005, p. 22). It may also affect the acceptance of democratic principles and attitudes toward specific issues (Galston, 2001).

**Political participation**

Besides political interest and political knowledge, other factors also drive the gap in political participation between men and women. Historically, women were denied suffrage in the USA, which likely contributed to lower levels of participation in general (Conway, 2001). That changed slowly, with only 15 states allowing for women to vote prior to the passage and ratification of the 19th Amendment in 1920. It took until the mid-eighties for levels of voting among women to reach those of men.

However, levels of almost all other types of political participation – including engaging in deliberative discussion (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2014; Nir & McClurg, 2015), attempting to persuade others how to vote, displaying campaign signs or wearing campaign buttons, attending political meetings or rallies, working for a candidate or a party, and donating money to a political campaign – among women still lag behind those of men (Conway, 2001). Particularly notable among these is the likelihood of persuading others to vote a certain way, which is an especially pronounced gap (Hansen, 1997). These gaps have persisted, even as women became more likely to vote than men (Verba et al., 1997). Worldwide, women are more likely than men to have voted and engaged in ‘private’ activism, while men are more likely to have engaged in direct contact, collective types of actions and be (more active) members of political parties (Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2010).

Men continue to earn more than women, and childcare responsibilities often restrict career progress for women (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2005; Schlozman, Burns, & Verba, 1999). Both of these factors lead to less leisure time, less career impetus to participate in politics, and more gendered expectations away from political participation (Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Luskin, 1990; Sapiro, 1983). Higher education and group membership contribute to decreases in the gender gap, but are not sufficient to eliminate it (Dow, 2009).
At the highest levels of participation – running for and holding elected office – women lag far behind men (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2008). This is attributed primarily to differences in political ambition (though the question remains as to why women have lower political ambition), although those differences have narrowed over time (Costantini, 1990; Fulton, Maestas, Maisel, & Stone, 2006; True, 2013). Additionally, women are less likely to be asked to run for office than men, and less likely to view themselves as qualified to do so (Fox & Lawless, 2004). Currently, women fill only 20 of the 100 seats in the US Senate, and 79 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives (18%, Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics, 2014). Even when women do hold higher office, evidence suggests they are still often constrained by gendered expectations (Kathlene, 1994; Mattei, 1998). At times, it has been suggested that increased numbers of female office holders may also affect participation levels among women in society (Hansen, 1997; Uhlaner, 2012).

The tendency for women to engage in politics less than men do has been attributed to a variety of mechanisms, including a parallel confidence gap, conflict avoidance, and greater emphasis on preserving social bonds (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2014). These will be further considered below.

**Online content creation**

In addition to the political gender gaps identified above, a worldwide gender-based digital divide has emerged in research on access to and use of online platforms (Drabowicz, 2014). This divide has persisted since the earliest days of Internet research, and is generally manifested in both access and use (Bimber, 2000). A great deal of the early gap in access especially was due to socioeconomic factors, and gaps are smaller for younger generations (Helsper, 2010), but gaps in different types of use have persisted (Bimber, 2000) and persist across generational cohorts (Calenda & Meijer, 2009). Women are still ‘less frequent and less intense users of the Internet’ (Ono & Zavodny, 2003, p. 111).

Part of the remaining divide is due to men’s and women’s attitudes toward online arenas, and tends to be mediated by cognitive factors such as privacy concerns and self-efficacy (Hoffman, Lutz, & Meckel, 2015). Although women and men have roughly the same online skills, women perceive their skills to be less than those of men (Li & Kirkup, 2007; Schumacher & Morahan-Martin, 2001), a pattern echoing other STEM (Science Technology Engineering and Math)-related perceptions and skills (Hargittai & Shafer, 2006). Men are more likely to share content online than women, but that is partially an artifact of skills and perceived skills as well (Hargittai & Shaw, 2015; Hargittai & Walejko, 2008).

Despite the shrinking overall gap, differences still persist in how men and women spend their time online. Generally, women are more likely to go online for social interaction and relationship maintenance, whereas men tend to seek information online (Abraham, Morn, & Vollman, 2010; Colley & Maltby, 2008; Fallows, 2005), replicating a broader pattern of gender differences in communication (Wood & Rhodes, 1992). Male-preferred information seeking includes activities such as reading news, looking for jobs, seeking information about sports and finances, reading politics, and playing games (Li & Kirkup, 2007; Weiser, 2000a, 2000b). Gender also plays a role in perceptions of technology, and especially communication technology – men and women have different uses and
gratifications for using technology, generally aligning with the patterns described above (Ilie, Van Slyke, Green, & Hao, 2005).

This pattern continues in the more specific realm of social networking sites, or social media. Women use Facebook primarily to maintain existing relationships, while men are more likely to use it to reach out to new contacts or find job leads (Muscanell & Guadagno, 2012). Moreover, women are more likely to use Facebook in the first place, and use it more frequently than do men (Kimbrough, Guadagno, Muscanell, & Dill, 2013; though see Strandberg, 2013). These stark patterns again seem to rely on socialization, emerging as early as age 12 years (Jackson et al., 2008).

These patterns also vary by social media platform. Women are more likely to use Facebook and Instagram than men, and much more likely to use Pinterest, but no more likely to use Twitter and less likely to use LinkedIn (Pew, 2013).

**Politics on social media**

Considering the two gaps together—in both the political realm and online—becomes especially important as politics increasingly moves online. Over the past two decades, we have seen a rapid transition in political campaigns and a slower one in everyday politics. Fundraising, recruitment, get-out-the-vote efforts, and information dissemination all occur online (Kreiss, 2012). This means that political engagement online is both present and important, and therefore worthy of study.

The political migration to online platforms presents citizens, campaigns, and elected officials with enormous opportunities. The online realm lowers information costs (Shirky, 2008) and offers a more convenient way of becoming involved in politics (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). While some scholars have voiced concerns that such activities might replace offline activities, in so-called slacktivism (Morozov, 2013), most research suggests that online politics complements offline, rather than replace it (Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2014; Boulianne, 2009, 2015; Vissers & Stolle, 2014; Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014).

**Combining literatures: generating expectations**

Generally, both the literature on political participation and the literature in the realm of online content creation suggest a gender-based participation gap—women are less likely to create content online, and less likely to be interested in or to participate in politics. For these reasons, we might expect that the combined behavior of these two realms—engaging in politics in an online setting—might also exhibit a gender gap.

Socialization also comes into play. Women and girls are socialized in ways that put social relationships at a premium. They are encouraged to be nice (Babcock, Laschever, Gelfand, & Small, 2003), polite (Smith-Hefner, 1988), and to regulate their emotions in order to spare the feelings of others (Fuchs & Thelen, 1988; Garner & Power, 1996). This should be particularly salient on social media, given the primacy of social relationships within that medium. Posting about politics, therefore, might be avoided by women, in order to maintain their social media relationships with others.

While few studies have emphasized gender directly, there is some conflicting evidence regarding whether men and women participate politically on social media differently.
Several studies have found that men are more likely to express themselves politically on social media (Lutz et al., 2014; Strandberg, 2013; Vochocova et al., 2016), whereas other studies find no gap to speak of (Gil de Zúñiga, et al., 2014; Vesnic-Alujevic, 2012). These conflicting findings highlight the importance of research focused specifically on social media, specifically on gender differences, and with a wide variety of variables capturing political expression.

Due to the conflicting findings of previous research, I offer a guiding research question rather than a directional hypothesis:

How do women and men compare in their engagement with politics on social media? (RQ1)

Going beyond this broad research question, there is reason to believe that different types of politically relevant social media use should demonstrate varying existence of gender gaps. In general, social media is used for social purposes – people use it to stay in touch with friends, find out about the lives of others, and see what is going on in their communities (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2011; Mitchell & Page, 2013). Social maintenance, however, tends to be particularly salient for women using social media – whereas men might find greater informational value in this realm, women tend to use social media for primarily social purposes (Muscanel & Guadagno, 2012).

For these reasons, we might expect the most striking differences among men and women in their political social media behaviors when a social element is in play. That is, political engagement in social media depends not only on political motivation, but also on concerns for social relationships that are inherent in that medium. This is a non-negligible factor, given that we know that many people dislike political content posted in social media (Vraga, Thorson, Kligler-Vilenchik, & Gee, 2015). Therefore, when it is a question of choosing politics or choosing relationships, women should be more likely than men to choose relationships – by avoiding confrontation (Gladue, 1991), and therefore also avoiding engaging in politics in social media. Indeed, this echoes previous research known as the ‘inhibition thesis,’ which posits that women are less likely to participate in politics, in part, because of self-restraint due to perceived gender roles (Hooghe & Stolle, 2004; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978). When this trade-off is less pronounced, differences in political engagement between men and women should also be less severe. In general, then,

Women will abstain from political engagement when they risk offending or alienating others.
(H1)

More specifically, we can break down the occasions which are most likely to cause offense or damage relationships. In the context of social media, some people are offended by politics (Vraga et al., 2015), which should result in women being likely to avoid the most visible and most offensive political behaviors more than men – those most likely to damage relationships by offending. Avoidance behaviors likely include refraining from posting about politics in the first place (H1A), unfriending for political reasons (H1B), and choosing to ignore disagreeable content (H1C). Posting about politics is highly visible – people are more likely to see content one creates as compared to content one likes or favorites. This is why I would expect women to engage in this type of behavior less than men. Unfriending for political reasons, on the other hand, is a low-visibility behavior that still allows women to express themselves politically, and potentially avoid disagreement. One of the most common reasons cited for unfriending for political reasons is disagreeing
with posts (Rainie & Smith, 2012). Unfriending in the case of disagreeing with a post is therefore a low confrontation response to such disagreement, and unlikely to inflict major damage on a social relationship. Similarly, choosing to ignore disagreeable comment is likewise both low visibility and unlikely to harm a social relationship.

However, other political behaviors carried out in social media are less likely to cause relationship damage. When political engagement is less visible or less likely to offend, there is less of a reason for women to avoid it in social media. This should include lower salience behaviors like liking and commenting, the motivation to use social media for political reasons (motivations are internal and therefore invisible to others), privately held attitudes related to political content experienced on social media (again, these are not seen by others), and offline behaviors related to social media political content (offline behaviors may be visible, but are likely not visible within social media). Because these predictions are essentially null relationships, I offer a research question rather than a directional hypothesis:

Are there gender gaps in less visible political behaviors on social media, including liking, commenting, privately held attitudes and motivations, and offline reactions? (RQ2)

**Methods**

To test for any gender-based patterns in political engagement via social media, I use the Pew Internet & American Life ‘Social networking sites and politics’ survey, from 2012. This survey was fielded from 20 January to 19 February 2012. Respondents were contacted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International, by both landline (N = 1350, response rate = 11.1%) and cell phone (N = 900, response rate = 10.8%), and interviewed in both English and Spanish. The overall sample is 51.3% female, 76.2% white, mean age of 46 years, with 53.1% with at least some college education (the modal education level is high school graduate), and average household income around $40,000 per year. In all, 27.2% of subjects identified as Republican, 37.2% as Independent, and 35.6% as Democrat; 37.8% of subjects identified as conservative, 36.9% as moderate, and 25.3% as liberal.

**Measurement**

Obviously, there are numerous ways to measure political engagement within social media. Rather than limit this study to any single definition of political engagement, I employ a number of different outcome measures to test different types of attitudes, reactions, and behaviors both within social media and as a result of exposure to political information within social media. As hypothesized, gender differences are not likely to exist equally in all types of behaviors. If and when differences between genders do exist, they can therefore be pinpointed to specific types of attitudes, reactions, and behaviors. The measures included below fulfill two criteria: First, they fit the definition of political engagement described above, and second, they occur in or as a direct result of using social media.

**Outcome variables**

I group the outcome variables into three broad categories. First is the general use of social media for political purposes. Second is reacting to disagreeable political content on social
media. Finally, I consider offline reactions to political social media content. Given the hypotheses above, differences should be most visible for reacting to disagreeable political content and posting highly visible political content. Descriptive statistics for all variables are available in Table 1.

Social media use for political purposes is measured in three different ways. First, I create a variable reflecting political motivations for using social media. Respondents were asked,

Overall, how important are social networking sites to you personally when it comes to … 1) keeping up with political news, 2) debating and discussing political issues with others, 3) finding other people who share your views about important political issues, and 4) recruiting people to get involved with political issues that matter to you. (responses ranged from 1 = not at all important to 4 = very important)

Responses to these four statements were averaged into an index, political SNS motivations (mean = 1.90, SD = 0.85, Cronbach’s α = .87). The second way I measure political social media use is a simple measure of frequency of posting political content. Respondents were asked, ‘Thinking about everything you have posted recently on social networking sites, such as status updates, comments, or links to news stories – about how much of what you have posted is related to politics, political issues or the 2012 elections?’ (responses range from 1 = none at all to 5 = all or almost all of it, mean = 1.60, SD = 0.96). A final set of ways that users might employ social media for political purposes include responding to political content, by commenting on it or ‘liking’ it. Respondents were asked, ‘Have you ever done any of the following on a social networking site?’ with dichotomous yes/no answers, where statements included, ‘clicked the “like” button in response to political comments or material posted by someone else’ (mean = 0.47, SD = 0.50), and ‘posted a positive comment in response to a political post or status update from someone else’ (mean = 0.39, SD = 0.49).

Reactions to disagreeable content on social media are another important outcome to consider. Given that many have voiced concerns over echo chamber effects in political social media use (Pariser, 2012), observing how users respond when they encounter disagreeable content is a timely concept to observe. One way this manifests is how often users

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1. Descriptive statistics.</th>
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<td>Minimum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political SNS motivations</td>
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<td>Political SNS postings</td>
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<td>Political SNS comments</td>
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<td>Political SNS likes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree politics SNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree politics SNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore/reply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfriend politics SNS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change opinion</td>
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<tr>
<td>More active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (F)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political talk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race (1 = nonwhite)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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</table>

* indicates not applicable
agree or disagree with political content in their social media feeds. Users were asked, ‘How often do you agree/disagree with the political opinions or political content your friends post on social networking sites?’ (answers ranged from 1 = Never to 4 = Always or almost always, Agree mean = 2.24, SD = 0.72; Disagree mean = 2.14, SD = 0.65). Reassuringly, users report disagreement with political content about as often as they report agreement.

We might also be interested in how users respond to disagreeable content when they encounter it. Pew asks, ‘When one of your friends posts something about politics on a social networking site that you disagree with, how do you usually respond? Do you usually ignore the post you disagree with or respond to it by posting a comment or posting something of your own?’ (Ignore = 1, Respond = 2, mean = 1.30, SD = 0.46). Along the same lines, we might be interested in how often people close off talk entirely, due to political reasons. For this concept, I created a variable reflecting different political reasons for unfriending. Pew asked,

> When using social networking sites, have you ever blocked, unfriended or hidden someone because they … Posted too frequently about politics or political issues, posted something about politics or political issues that you disagreed with or found offensive, argued about political issues on the site with you or someone you know, disagreed with something you posted about politics or political issues, or posted something related to politics or political issues that you worried would offend your other friends or people who follow you?

Responses were dichotomous yes (1)/no (0), and it is worth noting that unfriending for political reasons is an exceptionally rare activity, with only about 7% of users reporting doing so. These five items were averaged to form a scale of political unfriending (mean = 0.07, SD = 0.19, Cronbach’s α = .77).

Finally, I consider the range of offline responses to political content on social media. These are particularly relevant given the ‘slacktivism’ critiques of social media – that engagement online may actually satisfy the political engagement needs of users such that they no longer engage in offline activities (see, e.g., Morozov, 2013). These are measured rather simply, asking (answers are yes (1) or no (0)), ‘Have you, personally, ever … changed your views about a political issue after discussing it or reading posts about it on a social networking site’ (mean = 0.17, SD = 0.37), ’become more active or involved in a political issue after discussing it or reading posts about it on a social networking site’ (mean = 0.25, SD = 0.44), or ’become less active or involved in a political issue after discussing it or reading posts about it on a social networking site’ (mean = 0.09, SD = 0.29).

**Independent variables**

The variable of interest is gender. In the Pew survey, this is a binary variable, with 51.3% of the sample identifying as female.

I also include a variable for frequency of political talk with friends and family (1 never to 4 very often, mean = 2.89, S.D. = 1.01), as this is commonly associated with political engagement. Finally I include several control variables, including age (mean = 46.4, S.D. = 18.3), race (binary, 76.2% white), education (modal education level is high school graduate), income (mean income is around $40,000 per year), partisanship (27.2% Republican, 37.2% Independent, and 35.6% Democrat), and ideology (37.8% conservative, 36.9% moderate, and 25.3% liberal).
Analysis and discussion

In order to determine to what extent gender differences emerge in the realm of politics on social media, I conducted a number of tests to see if men and women were equally likely to engage in different types of political activities.

The first category of variables (Table 2) includes measures related to using social media for political reasons. Recall that the literature suggests that particularly visible manifestations of this general concept should be those that tend to produce gender differences – in which men – but not women – are willing to post politics even if they think it might offend some people in their networks. This is just the pattern of results we see. Men are no more likely than women to report social media as important for political motivations ($\beta = 0.03$, SE = 0.03), which is an attitude that can be held without exposing it to others within a network. However, men are more likely than women to actually post about politics on social media ($\beta = -0.13$, SE = 0.04). This behavior is a visible manifestation of the attitude of thinking social media is a good place for politics, which likely explains why we see the gendered difference. In the former instance, no one can be offended or alienated, whereas in the latter people likely are. Finally, we consider lower salience but still visible behaviors – commenting on and liking political content and friending for political reasons. In each instance ($\beta = -0.10$, SE = 0.09; $\beta = 0.13$, SE = 0.08) men are no more likely to engage in these political behaviors than women. These activities are less visible and less attributable than posting original content, which may contribute to this non-gendered finding.

The second category of variables (Table 3) is where we are more likely to see differences between men and women (H1B, H1C). These measures involve reacting to disagreeable content – when one might want to be confrontational or defensive, but might rather choose to avoid the issue entirely in order to maintain social relationships. Indeed, we find that women are more likely than men to unfriend people for political reasons ($\beta = 0.02$, SE = 0.01), confirming H1B. However, women are no more or less likely to agree or disagree with political content they see on social media (which may speak more to the diversity of their network than any particular attitudes they hold), nor are they more or less likely to ignore or reply to disagreeable political content ($\beta = -0.03$, SE = 0.03; $\beta = 0.01$, SE = 0.03; $\beta = -0.09$, SE = 0.11). This latter finding goes against expectations (H1C), as we would expect women to be more likely to ignore the content in order to maintain social relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political SNS motivations</th>
<th>Political SNS postings</th>
<th>Political SNS comments</th>
<th>Political SNS likes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Gender (F)</td>
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<td>-0.13 (0.04)*</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
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<td>0.24 (0.04)*</td>
<td>0.34 (0.11)*</td>
<td>0.16 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (D)</td>
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<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.06)*</td>
<td>0.03 (0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.03)*</td>
<td>0.19 (0.03)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk about politics</td>
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<td>0.43 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.91 (0.06)*</td>
<td>0.76 (0.05)*</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>2763</td>
<td>2767</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td>2741</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The models predicting political SNS motivations and political SNS postings are ordinary least squares regression; the models predicting political SNS comments and likes are logistic regression. Unstandardized betas are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05.
The third category of outcomes (Table 4) looks at reactions to political content on social media that happen outside of, but as a direct result of using social media. In this category, we see no behaviors that occur differently for men and women. Women are no more or less likely to change their attitudes about an issue ($\beta = 0.05$, SE = 0.10), become more involved ($\beta = 0.09$, SE = 0.09), or become less involved ($\beta = -0.22$, SE = 0.14) in an issue based on what they have seen on social media. Again, given that the behaviors occur outside of social media, they are less visible and therefore less likely to alienate others. Therefore, we should not be surprised that gender differences do not emerge for these manifestations of political engagement.

**Limitations**

These data are somewhat limited by their nature. Survey data are imperfect records of actual behaviors, and there is evidence to suggest that respondents are particularly inaccurate when it comes to recalling social media behaviors (Junco, 2013), though they are somewhat better at identifying politics in social media (Vraga, Bode, Smithson, & Troller-Renfree, 2016).

Importantly, I also cannot disentangle exactly which aspects of social media or the political focus within it might be resulting in the unexpected non-role gender seems to play. Future research should endeavor to isolate these elements in order to better understand why political engagement on social media seems to behave counter to expectations. Disentangling the effects of individual social media platforms is also a worthwhile pursuit. The motivations of men and women for posting and learning about politics in social

### Table 3. Predicting reactions to political content on social media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Unfriend</th>
<th>Reply/Ignore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (F)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.03)*</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>1.03 (0.12)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)*</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (D)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.10 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)*</td>
<td>0.03 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.21 (0.04)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk about</td>
<td>0.20 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.03 (0.01)*</td>
<td>0.65 (0.08)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>2128</td>
<td>2767</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The models predicting agreement, disagreement, and unfriending are ordinary least squares regression; the model predicting replying or ignoring disagreeable content is a logistic regression. Unstandardized betas are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05

### Table 4. Predicting offline behaviors as a result of political content on social media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change opinion</th>
<th>More active</th>
<th>Less active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (F)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>0.13 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship (D)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.06)*</td>
<td>0.17 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.03)*</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk about</td>
<td>0.53 (0.07)*</td>
<td>0.67 (0.06)*</td>
<td>0.21 (0.08)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2743</td>
<td>2603</td>
<td>2644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All models are logistic regression. Unstandardized betas are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

*p < .05
media should also be explored more deeply (Harrison & Munn, 2007), as that is beyond the scope of this research.

Finally, other variables with known associations with political engagement, including media use, political interest, and political knowledge, were not included in the analyses, as they were not available in the data set. Future research should replicate these analyses with additional data to determine the extent to which those variables affect the results presented here.

**Conclusions**

Overall, though, gender differences seem much less pervasive in political engagement on social media than might have been expected. Men are more likely to post political information, and women are slightly more likely to unfriend people for political reasons, but all other specifications of political engagement in social media showed no gender differences.

This is particularly important, given the vast literature outlined above that generally suggests gender differences in political activity and in social media use independently. Why, then, might the intersection of the two be less likely to produce gender differences? What makes social media, or specifically political engagement within that realm, different from similar activities in other arenas or contexts?

This research highlights the need for multiple understandings of political engagement in the modern media environment (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Theocharis, 2015). Part of the reason for conflicting findings in previous research on the topic is almost certainly the difference in measures used to capture this key concept. By employing breadth in the conceptualization and operationalization of political engagement, this project pinpoints specific areas where gender differences might be expected to play out, and mobilizes appropriate empirical data to demonstrate that these differences do emerge, whereas others (where, theoretically, they should not exist) do not. This also highlights the importance of researchers to specifically define what they mean by political expression (Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009) or political behavior (Theocharis, 2015), or politics in general (Vraga et al., 2016) when doing research, in order to better clarify their conclusions.

As in other recent research showing essentially byproduct effects of being on social media resulting in increased exposure to political information and potential knowledge effects as a result (Bode, 2016), it is possible that social media is a fundamentally different type of media experience, changing our understanding of how people gain, use, and propagate political information in the modern media environment. This is a new understanding of an old idea – that the Internet can sometimes improve representation of voices heard by lowering the costs of participating (Albrecht, 2006). Because women are more likely to use social media, and use it more intensely for relationship maintenance (Muscanell & Guadagno, 2012), they seem to be able to overcome the structural and social factors that lead to deficits in political information exposure, political knowledge, and political engagement in other areas.

Notably, they do so by engaging in less visible political behaviors on social media. Rather than posting themselves about politics, they are more likely to comment or like others’ political postings. This difference is worth pursuing in the future, in both offline and online contexts. For instance, are there ways that women similarly engage in less
offensive political behaviors offline? In the online realm, do these different types of political behaviors change how they feel about or experience politics? Do these avoidance behaviors have their desired outcome? That is, do other users indeed perceive commenting, liking, and replying to be more palatable than posting original content? And do social media users see different political content in general because women are less likely to post content of their own? This area of research is rich and this study only begins to scratch the surface. Still, this study represents an important contribution in the continuing scholarship on differences between men and women in politics, content creation, and political expression. Political engagement in the modern media environment is clearly more complicated, more nuanced, and more difficult to study, but presents an exciting new element of democratic communication.

Notes

1. Certainly a large part of the political gender gap literature has focused on the gender gap in political ideology (see, for instance, Kaufman & Petrocik, 1999; Schlesinger & Heldman, 2001; Trevor, 1999). Because that area is generally outside the scope of this study, it will therefore be omitted.

2. Ideally, other variables would have been included with known associations with political engagement, including media use, political interest, and political knowledge. Unfortunately, these variables were not available from Pew. Future research should build on this work to create and test more robust models of these effects.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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References


